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Abstract: Granting that there could be true subjunctive conditionals of libertarian 
freedom (SCls), I argue (roughly) that there could be such conditionals only 
in connection with individual “possible creatures” (in contrast to types). This 
implies that molinism depends on the view that, prior to creation, God grasps 
possible creatures in their individuality. In making my case, I explore the 
notions of counterfactual implication (that relationship between antecedent and 
consequent of an SCl which consists in its truth) and counterfactual relevance 
(that feature of an antecedent in virtue of which it counterfactually implies 
something or other).
I. INTroDuCTIoN
let ‘C’ stand for the history of our universe up to the time at which 
the apostle Peter freely performed some action A. According to the 
molinist theory of divine providence,1 we may say that God knew, prior 
to creation, a subjunctive conditional of libertarian freedom (SCl) to the 
effect that, were Peter in C, he would freely A. let ‘Truth’ stand for the 
thesis that there are, prior to creation, true SCls; and ‘Knowledge’ for the 
thesis that God knows, prior to creation, such SCls. by ‘prior to creation’ 
1 See Alfred J. Freddoso, “Introduction”, pp. 1-81 in luis De molina, On Divine 
Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia, ed. and trans. Freddoso (Ithaca: Cornell 
university Press, 1988); and Thomas P. Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account 
(Ithaca: Cornell university Press, 1998).
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I mean logically prior to God’s making any creative decision. We may 
say that ‘prior to creation’ picks out the pre-creation world phase, where 
a “phase” need not be temporal.
Truth and Knowledge can be challenged in a way that, as far as 
I am aware, has not yet been explored. molinists have recognized that 
there are thorny issues in connection with referring to a creature in the 
context of a pre-creation world phase at which the creature does not 
exist; and have accordingly suggested that the SCls known in “middle 
knowledge” (that alleged logical moment of knowing posterior to God’s 
“natural knowledge” and prior to a creative decree and “free knowledge”) 
directly involve, not “possible creatures” per se, but possibly exemplified 
individual essences.2 So one might suppose that, prior to creation, God 
knows not (1) but (2)
(1) Were Peter in C, he would freely A [in C]
(2) Were an exemplifier of E in C, it [that exemplifier] would freely A,
where ‘E’ stands for a property the exemplifying of which is necessary and 
sufficient for being Peter. However, it is controversial whether essences 
of possible creatures exist prior to creation.3 one might think that, prior 
to creation, God grasps neither (1) nor (2) but rather something like (3):
(3) Were an exemplifier of F in C, it would freely A;
where ‘F’ stands for a type, i.e., a property exemplified by more than one 
possible individual (whether in a possible world – for example, by Peter 
and Paul in W – or across possible worlds – for example, by Peter in 
W and Paul in W*). let us say that an agent-singular SCl concerns an 
individual possible agent, as (1) and (2) do;4 and that an agent-general 
SCl concerns a type, as (3) does.
2 See Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 
187-188; Jonathan l. Kvanvig, The Possibility of an All-Knowing God (New York: St. 
martin’s Press, 1986), pp. 122, 124-126; and Flint, Divine Providence, pp. 46-47, 124.
3 See, e.g., robert merrihew Adams, “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity”, Journal 
of Philosophy 76 (1979), 5-26; robert merrihew Adams, “Actualism and Thisness”, Synthese 
49 (1981), 3-41; Alvin Plantinga, “on existentialism”, Philosophical Studies 44 (1983), 
1-20; Kit Fine, “Plantinga on the reduction of Possibilist Discourse”, pp. 145-186 in Alvin 
Plantinga, ed. James e. Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen (boston: D. reidel Publishing 
Company, 1985), pp. 155-156; linda Zagzebski, “Individual essence and the Creation”, pp. 
119-144 in Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism, ed. Thomas 
V. morris (Ithaca: Cornell university Press, 1988); and Christopher menzel, “Temporal 
Actualism and Singular Foreknowledge”, Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991), 475-507.
4 I am ignoring “impossible agents” and SCls involving them.
67molINISm, CreATure-TYPeS, AND CouNTerFACTuAl ImPlICATIoN
but suppose that there are no true agent-general SCls. That is, suppose 
that, whatever one wants to say about individuals such as Peter and Paul, 
there are no facts of the matter about what kinds of agents would freely 
do in various circumstances. If there were true SCls (if at all) only for 
individuals, and if no agent-singular SCls were to exist prior to creation, 
then Truth (and therefore Knowledge) would be false.5 And if there were 
true SCls (if at all) only for individuals, and no agent-singular SCls 
were grasped prior to creation, then Knowledge would be false. These 
considerations suggest the following anti-molinism argument:
(4) An SCl is true only if agent-singular.
(5) Prior to creation, God does not grasp any agent-singular SCls.
Therefore,
(6) Prior to creation, God does not know any SCls.
(4) imposes a constraint on the nature of true SCls (should there be any), 
and (5) implies that the constraint is not satisfied by any items of pre-
creation divine cognizance. (5) could be true because there are no agent-
singular SCls at the pre-creation world phase, or because, though there 
are, they are not grasped. Now, there would seem to be no good reason to 
accept (5) apart from accepting a stronger premise denying a pre-creation 
divine grasp of “agent-singular” propositions more generally; such as
(7) Were an exemplifier of E in C, it might freely A
(8) Were Peter in C, he would probably freely A
(9) Were an exemplifier of E in C, it would A
(10) Were Peter to exist, he would exist
(11) Peter does not exist.
However, one might affirm such a view and nevertheless hold that (7) 
through (11) have certain “agent-general” correlates that God does grasp 
prior to creation; related true propositions that can play an action-guiding 
role for God. (4) precludes there being such correlates in the case of SCls.
It may be instructive to contrast the nature of this challenge to 
molinism with that posed by the “grounding objection”, perhaps the 
most prominent objection to molinism. The grounding objector attacks 
either Truth (and thereby Knowledge) or Knowledge by focusing on the 
connection – or lack thereof – between an allegedly true SCl’s antecedent 
and consequent. (10)’s antecedent necessitates its consequent, as do those 
5 I am assuming that a proposition can have a truth-value prior to creation and be 
known prior to creation only if it exists prior to creation.
68 DANIel murPHY
of (7), (8), and (9) (we could easily suppose, in each case); whereas the SCl 
(1)’s does not. The grounding objector thinks that the alleged pre-creation 
truth (or knowledge) of SCls both needs and lacks grounds. However, 
the anti-molinism argument I have sketched does not turn on the nature 
of the relationship between an SCl’s antecedent and consequent, nor on 
the relevant propositions’ even being conditionals; since the existence and 
graspability of a proposition turns on its “matter” rather than its “form” (so 
to speak). one might deny that there exists an agent-singular SCl prior to 
creation, while granting that, were one to so exist, it would non-vacuously 
take a truth-value. And were such an SCl to exist prior to creation, one 
might deny that God grasps it prior to creation, while granting that, were 
He to so grasp it, He would grasp its truth-value.
The “prior to creation” index is crucial in these considerations. It  is 
consistent with this argument that God comes to know some agent-
singular SCls posterior to creation; either because He comes to grasp 
them then, or because they come to exist and take a truth-value then. 
Such knowledge would be “middle knowledge” qua content (contingent 
truths over which God has no control), but not “middle knowledge” 
proper or qua stage of knowing.6 other anti-molinism arguments have 
turned on considerations pertaining to the pre-creation world phase, but 
the challenge I have described turns on considerations pertaining to the 
existence and/or graspability of agent-singular SCls, not on considerations 
pertaining either to possible world semantics for counterfactuals7 or to 
explanatory priority and libertarian freedom.8
my aim in this paper is not to argue for the soundness of this anti-
molinism argument. I am inclined to think that (5) is false, that God does 
grasp, prior to creation, possible creatures in their individuality; though 
I think cogently defending such a position in light of objections that 
have been raised is no easy task.9 In what follows, my aim is to motivate 
6 It would be fallacious to infer, from a conditional’s coming to be true “post-
volitionally”, that it becomes true because of divine volition; as William Craig seems to 
do – see William lane Craig, “middle Knowledge, Truth-makers, and the ‘Grounding 
objection’”, Faith and Philosophy 18 (2001), 337-352, 339.
7 See, e.g., edward r. Wierenga, The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes 
(Ithaca: Cornell university Press, 1989), pp. 148-150.
8 See, e.g., Wes morriston, “explanatory Priority and the ‘Counterfactuals of Freedom’”, 
Faith and Philosophy 18 (2001), 21-35.
9 See, e.g., “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity” and “Actualism and Thisness” 
by Adams, and menzel’s “Temporal Actualism and Singular Foreknowledge”.
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a qualified version of (4). If (4) is true, then to the extent that one finds a 
theory of pre-creation divine knowledge on which God grasps individual 
possible creatures implausible, to that extent (at least) one should find 
molinism implausible. That is, molinism could be no more plausible than 
such a theory of divine knowledge. 
II. SCls
by ‘subjunctive conditional of libertarian freedom’ (‘SCl’), I mean 
a proposition to the effect that, were some agent in a certain circumstance, 
it would act in a certain way, freely (in a libertarian sense). SCls constitute 
one kind of subjunctive conditional of indeterministic activity (SCI); 
where an SCI is a proposition to the effect that, were something with 
causal powers or liabilities in a certain circumstance, it would exercise 
such in a certain way, contingently. The class of SCls is not wholly 
contained within that of SCIs, since some SCl consequents would obtain 
necessarily given their antecedents (e.g., “were God to freely A, He 
would freely A”); but I am only discussing SCls that are SCIs. Further, 
I am only discussing SCIs the truth-values of which God cannot directly 
bring about (this qualification plausibly being redundant with SCls for 
creatures), and I am only discussing SCIs with possible antecedents. I will 
assume in what follows that, for all we know, there could be true SCIs 
and SCls; my argumentation not relying on assumptions that a molinist 
should be expected to reject.
let us think of an SCI as connecting two states of affairs. The truth 
of an SCI p implies, of some states of affairs S and T, that were S to 
obtain, T would contingently obtain. So, the truth of p could not consist 
in S’s necessitating T. Further, p’s truth could not be grounded in any 
connection between S and T established by divine decree. moreover, 
p’s pre-creation truth plausibly could neither consist nor be otherwise 
grounded in either the obtaining of S and/or T or the obtaining of any 
categorical facts of the matter to the effect that S and/or T “will” obtain. 
even were there such facts,10 p’s truth “persists through” possible pre-
creation world phases wherein there are not,11 suggesting that p’s truth 
could be at most overdetermined by them. on my understanding, true 
10 See Timothy o’Connor, “The Impossibility of middle Knowledge”, Philosophical 
Studies 66 (1992), 139-166, 152.
11 See Flint, Divine Providence, pp. 47, 124.
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SCIs would be just true, and contingently: they could have been false 
instead. I will use the phrase ‘counterfactual implication’12 to denote 
this connection, insofar as it is a connection, between the antecedent 
and consequent of a true SCI. Counterfactual implication is a relation 
from one state of affairs to another that consists simply in the truth of 
an SCI, and the truth of an SCI is primitive.13 more precisely, I think 
that molinism implies the existence of a privileged class of SCIs – perfect 
SCIs – for which both of these claims would be true. A true perfect SCI 
is primitively true, and the counterfactual implying of such an SCI’s 
antecedent of its consequent consists simply in its truth. However, there 
conceivably are imperfect SCIs which have their truth-values in virtue of 
other things; such as the truth-values of certain perfect SCIs.14 In what 
follows, I will elucidate and motivate a qualified version of (4), in large 
part by exploring the distinction between perfect and imperfect SCIs.
III. PerFeCT AND ImPerFeCT SCls
Consider the agent-general (3)
(3) Were an exemplifier of F in C, it would freely A,
and suppose that Peter and Paul are each possible exemplifiers or tokens of 
F in C, that each one’s being in C would partly consist in his exemplifying 
F, and – for simplicity – that they are the only possible tokens of F in C. 
In other words, the obtaining of either (1)’s or (12)’s antecedent
(1) Were Peter in C, he would freely A
(12) Were Paul in C, he would freely A
implies that of (3)’s, and the obtaining of (3)’s implies that of either (1)’s 
or (12)’s.
I am initially inclined to accept (4)
(4) An SCl is true only if agent-singular
12 I have borrowed this phrase from Thomas Flint (Flint, Divine Providence); though 
it may be subjected to somewhat different treatment in my hands.
13 one might think that true SCIs are grounded by certain “facts” (such as facts revealed 
by disquoting sentences expressing SCIs). If one does, he can qualify my remarks about 
primitive truth accordingly. but I think that the molinist should just maintain that SCIs 
do not need grounds. Cf. ibid., p. 137; Craig, “middle Knowledge, Truth-makers, and the 
‘Grounding objection’”; and Trenton merricks, Truth and Ontology (oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2007), pp. 150-151.
14 Cf. Flint, Divine Providence, p. 50, n. 21.
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because I am initially inclined to think that there could not be any fact of 
the matter about what a kind of agent would freely do in any circumstance. 
A non-molinist might favour such a view because he thinks that there 
could not be any fact of the matter about what any agent would freely do 
in any circumstance. However, I think that there are special problems for 
the truth of agent-general SCls.
Accordingly, the idea that there could not be facts of the matter about 
what kinds of agents would freely do needs to be qualified, for there are 
conceivable ways in which there could be such facts in virtue of being 
parasitic on facts about what individual agents would do. For example, 
suppose that (1) and (12) are true. It follows from this and from the fact 
that Peter and Paul are the only possible F-tokens in C that (3) is true. 
That is, if it is true of every possible F-token in C that it would freely 
A, then it is true that, were an F-exemplifier in C, it would freely A. 
Alternatively, suppose that both (13)
(13) Were an exemplifier of F in C, its identity would be that of Peter15
and (1) are true.16 In these two cases, the agent-general (3) is imperfect, 
since it has its truth-value in virtue of other SCIs. In the first case, a true 
(3) would have import for possible F-tokens in general only through the 
logically prior obtaining of facts about every individual possible F-token 
(in C); and in the second case, a true (3) would not have import for 
possible F-tokens in general.
because it is conceivable that there be true imperfect agent-general 
SCls, I want to contend, not for (4) but for (14)
(4) An SCl is true only if agent-singular
(14) An SCl is perfect only if agent-singular.
(14) implies that the class of perfect SCls falls completely within the class 
of agent-singular SCls. Suppose, contrary to (14), that (3) is a perfect 
SCl that is true prior to creation. It seems to follow that (1) and (12) are 
15 This does not fit my description of an SCI, though it is an “SCI” in a broader sense, 
where “indeterministic activity” encompasses the contingent obtaining of facts about 
identity.
16 This inference is not based on the assumption of any transitivity principle. Cf. 
David lewis, Counterfactuals (malden, mA: blackwell Publishers, 1973), pp. 32-35. 
Since Peter’s being in C entails an F-exemplifier’s being in C, the “closest” possible worlds 
wherein (1)’s antecedent obtains are worlds wherein (13)’s and (3)’s does. And given (13), 
the closest ones wherein this antecedent obtains are ones wherein (1)’s does. Adding in 
(1), the closest ones wherein these antecedents obtain are ones wherein Peter freely A’s; 
such that (3) is true.
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both true (or would be, if/when each exists to take a truth-value; this 
qualification being subsequently left implicit). For I do not understand 
what it means to affirm the agent-general (3), if its truth does not have 
implications for what some possible tokens of F in C would freely do; and 
the truth of a perfect (3) seems to have import for all possible F-tokens in 
C if it has import for any. more generally, it seems that an agent-general 
SCl will have indiscriminate import for possible tokens of the relevant 
type in the relevant circumstance, unless it is grounded – implying 
imperfection – by something that “refracts” the range of import to 
a proper subset of such tokens. For example, if (3) were true partly in 
virtue of (13), it might not imply (12); but it would not be perfect. And 
if (3) became true only posterior to creation, and became true in virtue 
of the obtaining of (1)’s antecedent and consequent, it might not imply 
(12); but it would be imperfect.
Now, suppose that the law of conditional excluded middle (Cem) holds 
for the perfect (3); that is, that it is necessary that either (3) or (3*) is true
(3) Were an exemplifier of F in C, it would freely A
(3*) Were an exemplifier of F in C, it would not freely A.17
It follows from Cem’s holding for (3), (3)’s implying (1) and (12), and 
(3*)’s implying (1*) and (12*) that the conjunction of (1) and (12*)
(1) Were Peter in C, he would freely A
(12*) Were Paul in C, he would not freely A
is impossible. For if it is necessarily the case that either an F-exemplifier 
would freely A in C or an F-exemplifier would not freely A in C, then 
every possible world is such that it falls into (just) one of two groups: 
those in which an F-exemplifier would freely A in C, and those in which 
an F-exemplifier would not freely A in C. And if (3) implies (1) and (12) 
and (3*) (1*) and (12*), then there is no possible world in either group 
wherein Peter would and Paul would not freely A in C. If Cem holds 
for a perfect agent-general (3), then the agent-singular (1) and (12) 
necessarily take the same truth-value.
However, I find it plausible (granting that there are facts of the matter 
about what individuals would freely do in various circumstances) that 
17 In light of concerns that one might have over the modal status of the existence of 
agent-singular SCls, we may interpret Cem’s holding for an SCl p in terms of its being 
an essential property of the pair of p and p* that one of them is true. Notice also that 
the SCI p* will not itself be an SCl, since an agent’s contingently failing to freely do 
something does not imply its freely refraining to do it.
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it is possible that Peter would and a non-identical Paul would not freely 
A in C (and vice versa) – no matter how similar the F-tokens otherwise 
are (or would be). After all, it is possible that Peter would freely A in C, 
and it is possible that Peter would not freely A in C; and likewise with 
Paul. Why should not it be possible for it to be the case both that Peter 
would and Paul would not freely A in C? This possibility can be rendered 
compossible with (3) in two ways. First, suppose that (3) is true partly in 
virtue of (13). This undermines the reason for thinking that (3) precludes 
(12*). Second, suppose that, though (3) indeed entails (1) and (12), Cem 
fails for (3). (let us say that such an SCI is degenerate.) This implies the 
possibility of worlds wherein neither (3) nor (3*) is true. Now, (3) is 
clearly imperfect on the first option: its truth-value depends (in a robust, 
asymmetric sense) on the truth-values of (1) and (13). And concerning 
the second option, it seems that the best (if not only) explanation for 
(3)’s being degenerate is that it is imperfect in a different way; namely, 
in that the truth-values of (3) and (3*) depend on how truth-values 
are distributed across (1) and (12). That is, the possible truth of the 
conjunction of (1) and (12*) explains (in a robust, asymmetric sense) the 
possibility of worlds wherein both (3) and (3*) are false.
I will discuss in the next section the idea that an agent-general SCl 
might be both degenerate and perfect, but for now it seems that we can 
provisionally say that (1) and (12*) are compossible only if (3) is imperfect. 
Since I find it plausible that (1) and (12*) are compossible, I am inclined 
to think that (3) is imperfect. And since the reasoning generalizes to any 
agent-general SCl, I am inclined to accept (14). To the extent that one 
shares my intuitions here, one already has a reason to accept (14). In the 
next two sections, I will present two lines of argument for (14). In the 
remainder of this section, I will discuss how contending for (14) instead 
of (4) affects the anti-molinism argument sketched in section I; and then 
say a bit more about the perfect / imperfect distinction.
let us assume (5), grant that there might be true agent-general 
SCls, but, in accordance with (14), maintain that any such SCls would 
be imperfect. If there existed no agent-singular SCls prior to creation, 
then there would be no true imperfect agent-general SCls, since the 
SCIs on which their truth would depend would not exist. This would 
not preclude the truth of agent-general SCls in general, for it might be 
that posterior to creation certain SCIs come to exist and (non-vacuously) 
take truth-values, and thereby come to ground truth-values for agent-
general SCls. If, on the other hand, there existed true agent-singular 
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SCls prior to creation, then the following two possibilities arise for 
pre-creation knowledge of agent-general SCls. First, suppose that the 
ungrasped (1) and (12) are true and ground the grasped (3), and that 
God grasps (3)’s truth. The probability of such an agent-general p’s being 
true depends partly on the number of agent-singular SCls q, r, s, etc. 
that need to harmonize in truth-value in the right way; which depends 
on the number of possible tokens of the relevant type in the relevant 
circumstance (the assumption that there are only two possible tokens of 
F in C was motivated solely by considerations of simplicity and brevity 
of exposition). Second, suppose that the ungrasped (1) and (13) are true 
and ground the grasped (3), and that God grasps (3)’s truth. There are 
complications for this way of generating truth for an agent-general p 
which there is no space to explore. Can God create two tokens of the 
relevant type in the relevant circumstance; and if so, can any relevant SCI 
of (13)’s form be true?
In contending for (14), I am in effect contending for the following 
view of the relationship between agent-singular and agent-general SCls 
(“Singularity”). The class of perfect SCls lies within that of agent-singular 
SCls, and agent-general SCls are imperfect, depending for their truth on 
certain agent-singular SCls. The salient alternative view (“Generality”) 
reverses the priority, maintaining that the class of perfect  SCls lies 
within that of agent-general SCls, and that agent-singular SCls are (to 
the extent that they exist) imperfect, depending for their truth on certain 
agent-general SCls.
on Singularity, the imperfection of an agent-general SCl p consists in 
its truth-value’s depending on the truth-value of more than one perfect 
SCI. let us say that such an SCI is complex; and that a non-complex 
SCI is simple. I have discussed two ways in which p might be complex; 
depending on whether there are or are not true SCIs concerning what 
the identity of a token of a type would be. If there are not, then p would 
seem to be degenerate. on Generality, agent-singular SCls need not be 
degenerate: it might be that Cem holds for (3), that a true (3) would 
ground (1), and that a true (3*) would ground (1*); such that Cem holds 
for (1). Further, agent-singular SCls need not be complex on this view: 
(1) has a sufficient ground in (3). I submit that the imperfection of (1) 
on Generality consists in (1)’s antecedent’s containing counterfactually 
irrelevant information.18 We can represent (3) and (1) as follows:
18 my use of ‘counterfactually (ir)relevant’ differs from Flint’s (Flint, Divine Providence, p. 245).
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(3) S > U
(1) (S&T) > U;
where ‘>’ stands for counterfactual implication, and ‘T’ for the information 
in (1) concerning the identity of the token of the type comprehended in 
(1) and (3). T is counterfactually irrelevant to U in the sense that T is not 
entailed by S and its being conjoined to S does not even possibly make 
any difference as to whether U is counterfactually implied. We may say 
that an argument from (3) to (1) would be valid, given an additional 
premise to the effect that the state of affairs with which the antecedent is 
“strengthened” (T) is counterfactually irrelevant.19 let us say that an SCI 
is pure if its antecedent includes only counterfactually relevant states of 
affairs; and impure otherwise.
I have said that a true perfect SCI is primitively true, and that the 
counterfactual implying of such an SCI’s antecedent consists simply 
in the SCI’s truth. Insofar as a true imperfect SCI is true in virtue of 
something else, we may say that the counterfactual implying of such an 
SCI’s antecedent consists in something more than the SCI’s truth (such 
as the counterfactual implyings of the antecedents of certain perfect 
SCIs). let us say that perfect SCI antecedents strictly counterfactually 
imply their consequents, and that imperfect SCI antecedents loosely do. 
We may elucidate the counterfactual irrelevance of T on Generality – and 
thereby the impurity of (1) – by saying that, strictly speaking, S&T does 
not counterfactually imply anything. rather, S&T only counterfactually 
implies U in the sense that a proper part, S, counterfactually implies U. Just 
as (1)’s truth is parasitic on (3)’s, S&T’s (loose) counterfactual implying 
is parasitic on S’s. Now, on Singularity, (1) is pure (its consequent’s being 
strictly counterfactually implied by S&T), the imperfection lying in 
(3) and its complexity; and we may elucidate this complexity in terms 
of (3)’s truth’s being grounded in more than one “instance” of (strict) 
counterfactual implication – for example, the harmonizing implyings of 
S&T and (12)’s antecedent S&T*.
Summing up, we have two views of the relationship between 
agent-singular and agent-general SCls, the first of which I take to be 
equivalent with (14). on Singularity, perfect SCls are agent-singular, 
and agent-general SCls are complex, the truth of which depends on the 
19 Such an argument would also be valid given the premise that T is entailed by S. 
We may assume for the sake of discussion that an entailment of something relevant is 
intrinsically relevant.
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truth of every SCI within a certain class (explaining why (3) might be 
degenerate); whereas on Generality, perfect SCls are agent-general, and 
agent-singular SCls are impure, containing counterfactually irrelevant 
information pertaining to the identity of the token of the type (explaining 
why (1) and (12) necessarily take the same truth-value). We may say 
that the imperfection of an impure SCI consists in its antecedent’s 
containing extraneous information relative to its counterfactually 
implying its consequent, and that the imperfection of a degenerate SCI 
consists in its antecedent’s not containing enough information to strictly 
counterfactually imply something or other.20
IV. THe PrIorITY oF THe SINGulAr (1/2)
I have submitted that Singularity is intuitively plausible. Consider any 
x, y, C, and free A such that Cem holds for x (y), C, and A. Why should 
it not be possible for it to be the case both that x would, and y would 
not, A in C – unless x and y are identical? It seems that the only possible 
agent z such that, necessarily, x would A in C just in case z would, is x 
itself. but were there a true, perfect agent-general SCl p, there would 
seemingly be some such C, A, and pair x and y (possible tokens of the type 
comprehended in p) for which this would not be possible. In this section, 
I will present an argument for Singularity, and in the next and final 
section, I will present another. The first turns on the idea that Singularity’s 
falsity implies that possible agents have a strange and implausible kind of 
counterfactual power over certain other possible agents. The second turns 
on a conception of the nature of counterfactual relevance on which the 
antecedents of agent-general SCls are not determinate enough in content 
to strictly counterfactually imply anything.
Suppose that Singularity is false, that God knows, prior to creation, 
the perfect agent-general (3)
(3) Were an exemplifier of F in C, it would freely A,
and that He creates two universes u and u* (two spatiotemporally 
unconnected systems), actualizing Peter’s being in C in u and Paul’s 
20 The latter description would also hold for any complex agent-general SCl on 
Singularity; but it does not hold for complex SCIs as such. For example, suppose that (for 
some S, T, U) S counterfactually implies both T and U. It might be that “S > (T&U)” is 
complex. It depends on whether “S > (T&U)” depends on “S > T” and “S > U” (in which 
case it is complex) or vice versa.
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being in C in u*. We may suppose that u and u* share qualitatively 
identical universe segments terminating respectively in Peter’s and Paul’s 
each being about to freely perform some action or other. It follows from 
the perfect (3)’s truth that Peter and Paul each freely A.
Now, were Peter to freely refrain from A’ing, (3) would not be true. He 
has “counterfactual power” over (3), the power to do something (refrain 
from A’ing) such that, were he to do it, (3) would not be true. but if (3) 
is perfect, then the relevant power constitutes a power to do something 
such that, were he to do it, (3*)
(3*) Were an exemplifier of F in C, it would not freely A
would be true; in which case Peter has the power to do something such 
that, were he to do it, either Paul would not be in C (as he in fact is) 
or Paul would not freely A (as he in fact does). For if Cem holds for 
(3), then every possible world includes the truth of either (3) or (3*) 
(exclusive), and there is no such world wherein one F-token in C does 
not freely A and another does. Further, if we assume that Peter does 
not have counterfactual power over whether Paul exists in C with full 
possession of the power over whether he A’s, then Peter’s unexercised 
power to refrain from A’ing constitutes a power to do something such 
that, were he to do it, Paul would freely exercise his (in fact unexercised) 
power to refrain from A’ing. And everything I have said about Peter’s 
power over Paul applies vice versa.
There seems to be no good reason to think that Peter has this kind 
of power over Paul, or vice versa (a fortiori, and vice versa). It seems 
utterly bizarre, and it seems far more plausible that Peter’s power to do 
otherwise consists merely in a counterfactual power over (1). We can 
affirm this if we accept Singularity and suppose that (3) is imperfect; and 
more specifically, degenerate. For were the agent-singular (1) and (12) 
perfect and the agent-general (3) degenerate, Peter’s unexercised power 
to refrain from A’ing would not imply any counterfactual power either 
over (12) or over the obtaining of any state of affairs involving Paul. Were 
Peter to freely refrain from A’ing, (3) would be false; and were Paul to 
freely A (as he in fact does), (3*) would be false. because Cem fails for 
(3), it is possible that both are false, permitting Peter and Paul to have no 
counterfactual power of the described kind over each other.
Now, I have been assuming that Cem holds for perfect SCIs; that is, 
that being degenerate suffices for being imperfect (and more specifically, 
complex). However, might we suppose that (3) is primitively true, and 
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yet that it is not necessarily the case that either (3) or (3*) is true? We 
could then suppose that Peter’s unexercised power to refrain from A’ing 
does not consist in a power to something implying (3)’s falsity and (3*)’s 
truth, but merely consists in a power to do something implying (3)’s 
falsity. And yet (3) is still perfect, contrary to Singularity.
In response to this objection, I insist that the link between being 
degenerate and being imperfect (such that the former suffices for the 
latter) is very plausible. First, rejecting this connection prohibits one 
from accepting the following natural view of the relationship between 
counterfactually relevant information and Cem. I find it natural to 
think that the reason for which Cem would fail for an SCI p lies in p’s 
antecedent’s not containing enough counterfactually relevant information 
to strictly counterfactually imply anything. In this vein, we may suppose 
that, with respect to any instance of indeterministic activity, there is 
a certain threshold of contextual information (describing the circumstances 
in which the activity takes place) such that Cem fails for an SCI involving 
that activity the antecedent of which fails to meet it; and such that Cem 
“kicks in” for an SCI the antecedent of which meets it.21 We can integrate 
our conception of counterfactual relevance with Cem by supposing 
that counterfactually relevant information is that enough of which 
suffices for there to be a determinate fact of the matter about what would 
contingently happen. Now, the antecedent of a perfect SCI has “enough” 
relevant information to counterfactually imply some state of affairs or 
other; where the import of ‘enough’ here is to indicate the satisfaction of 
a necessary condition for counterfactually implying something or other 
(otherwise the SCI would be imperfect). but on a view where (3) might 
be perfect and degenerate, having “enough” information is not sufficient 
for counterfactually implying anything. This makes it a matter of brute, 
contingent fact whether an antecedent with “enough” counterfactually 
relevant information counterfactually implies anything (over and above the 
contingency pertaining to what is counterfactually implied). but it seems 
implausible that it is primitive and contingent whether there is any fact of 
the matter about what would occur, were such an antecedent to obtain.22 
21 Cf. ibid., p. 47; Craig, “middle Knowledge, Truth-makers, and the ‘Grounding 
objection’”, p. 338; and Alexander r. Pruss, “Prophecy Without middle Knowledge”, 
Faith and Philosophy 24 (2007), 433-457, 433, 439.
22 And it seems just as implausible that the threshold for what constitutes “enough” 
varies across possible worlds.
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Second, denying this link between being degenerate and being 
imperfect gives rise to the following dilemma. With respect to an agent-
general p which is allegedly both perfect and degenerate, we can either 
retain the idea that an agent-singular q and r concerning possible tokens 
of the type comprehended in p are asymmetrically dependent on p for 
their alethic status, or we can give this up too, supposing that p, q, and 
r are all perfect. on the first horn, p would imply and ground q and r, 
p* would ground q* and r*, and the falsity of (p v p*) would ground 
(q v r) (exclusive); without implying – much less grounding – which 
disjunct is true. on the second horn, it seems that the truth-values 
of p, q, and r would be overdetermined. Suppose p, q, and r are all 
primitively true. It seems that q and r are overdetermined, being true 
both “primitively” and “in virtue of ” p.23 likewise, it seems that p is 
overdetermined, being true both “primitively” and “in virtue of ” (q & r). 
I submit that the consequences of both horns are implausible. In the first 
case, we have the possibility of a perfect agent-general SCl’s grounding 
the obtaining of an irreducibly disjunctive state of affairs concerning 
agent-singular SCls, and in the second case, we have the appearance of 
symmetric overdetermination of SCl truth-values. We can avoid both 
consequences by supposing that Cem fails for the agent-general (3) 
because it is imperfect; or more specifically, because of the way in which it 
is imperfect, namely, being such that the truth-values of (3) and (3*) are 
grounded in the truth-values of certain agent-singular SCls. bringing in 
my first point in response to the objection, we should hold that an SCI is 
degenerate because it does not contain enough counterfactually relevant 
information to (strictly) counterfactually imply anything.
Here is another objection to the argument for Singularity from 
counterfactual power. I presupposed that the type F and circumstance 
C comprehended in (3) are such that the former is possibly exemplified 
in the latter by two tokens in the same possible world. However, perhaps 
there are perfect agent-general SCls concerning types that can only be 
exemplified in the relevant circumstances by different agents in different 
possible worlds. let us modify the scenario such that, instead of having 
two universes and two F-tokens in one possible world, we have two 
possible worlds with qualitatively identical universe segments; Peter 
23 This “in virtue of ” predication need not be taken to be logically precluded by the 
supposed perfection of q and r, for we may suppose that being perfect does not (logically) 
preclude overdetermining “grounds”.
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being the relevant agent in one and Paul in the other (the nature of “F” 
and/or “C” now being such that an exemplifying of F in C precludes 
the co-existence of any diverse F-tokens in C). Now suppose that God 
actualizes a universe segment wherein Peter is in C. The truth of a perfect 
(3) implies that Peter freely A’s, and yet Peter has the unexercised power 
to do something such that, were he to do it, (3) would not be true. 
However, because no other F-tokens exist, Peter’s unexercised power 
does not seem to consist in any kind of counterfactual power over states 
of affairs involving other F-tokens.
In response, I claim that a relevantly similar, implausible kind of 
counterfactual power is implied in this kind of case too. Suppose that 
Peter freely A’s in C, and that he is made privy to the facts that (3) is 
a perfect agent-general SCl and that he was a token of F in C. Following 
his action, Peter can rationally infer with certainty that (3) is true, and 
that any other possible F-token in C would have freely A’ed, were it to 
have been placed in C instead of him. For just as there is no possible 
world in which Cem holds for (3) wherein an F-token x in C freely A’s 
and a token y in C fails to, there is no possible world in which Cem holds 
for a perfect (3) wherein it is the case both that x freely A’s in C and it is 
false that y would. Now intuitively, Peter should not be able to rationally 
infer with certainty anything about what any other possible F-token in C 
would have done, and the reason is that it is implausible that he has the 
kind of counterfactual power the knowledge of which would undergird 
the inference. Such power is implied by the perfection of (3) and can 
be rejected if we accept Singularity. First, we could suppose that (3) is 
complex and degenerate, true if at all in virtue of (1) and (12). Second, 
we could suppose that (3) is complex, true if at all in virtue of (1) and 
(13). In either case, Peter should not infer (12) after freely A’ing; as his 
freely A’ing would be compossible with (12*).
In the “intra-world” case (where F is multiply exemplified in one 
world), Peter has counterfactual power over categorical facts involving 
other possible F-tokens; whereas in the “transworld” case (where F is 
multiply exemplified across worlds), Peter has counterfactual power over 
irreducibly subjunctive facts involving other possible F-tokens (and, 
relative to his retrospective reasoning, counterfactual facts). And I think 
the cases are relevantly similar: both kinds of counterfactual power 
are strange and implausible, and both are precluded by Singularity. 
one might be inclined to some stronger conclusions. First, one might 
think that it can be shown that the kinds of power I have described are 
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metaphysically impossible. Second, one might think that these kinds 
of power are incoherent, in the sense that the possession of libertarian 
freedom (or, the kind of agency necessary for moral responsibility, 
from an incompatibilist perspective) is logically inconsistent with the 
possession of these kinds of counterfactual power. but I am here insisting 
merely that it is far more plausible that Singularity is true than that any 
possible agents have the described kinds of power.
V. THe PrIorITY oF THe SINGulAr (2/2)24
Another line of thought in support of Singularity comes from the 
following considerations pertaining to the nature of counterfactual 
relevance. We know that, were there true SCIs, the information in their 
antecedents would not ground their consequents, in the robust sense 
of providing metaphysically sufficient conditions. And even were one 
inclined to think that an SCI’s antecedent could explain the obtaining 
of its consequent, in spite of the non-necessitating connection from the 
former to the latter, it cannot be maintained that the role or function of 
the information in the antecedent of a perfect agent-general SCl would 
simply be to ground the consequent. For if an agent’s exemplifying 
a general property can explain either its performing or its failing to 
perform an action, then presumably the conjunctive state of affairs of two 
agents’ each exemplifying the property can explain the conjunctive state 
of affairs of one agent’s performing and the other’s failing to perform the 
action. And yet the truth of a perfect agent-general SCl would ground 
a uniformity in counterfactually implied action across its type’s possible 
tokens. Hence, the function of the information in a  perfect agent-
general SCl could not be, in its entirety, that of providing even a non-
necessitating ground for the proposition’s truth; for the ramifications of 
such a truth would outstrip those of a non-necessitating explanation for 
a token occurrence of indeterministic activity.
So what exactly is the role or function of the information in an SCI 
antecedent? I suggest that it should be taken to be that of providing, not 
a ground for the consequent, but an occasion for it; that is, an occasion 
of indeterministic activity with respect to which it is primitively the 
24 See also Dean Zimmerman, “Yet Another Anti-molinist Argument”, pp. 33-94 in 
Metaphysics and the Good, ed. l. m. Jorensen and Samuel Newlands (New York: oxford 
university Press, 2009).
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case that the consequent would contingently obtain.25 Now, occasions of 
activity, or circumstances of activity, are “modally fragile”,26 in the sense 
that even the slightest adjustment in non-relational properties changes 
the identity of the occasion. For example, if Peter leaps a puddle of water, 
we have one occasion of activity, and were one of the soles of one of Peter’s 
sandals slightly thinner, we would have a different occasion of activity. 
And if Peter is wearing Fred the sandal when he jumps, we have one 
occasion, and were he wearing Todd the sandal instead, a qualitatively 
identical but numerically diverse sandal, we would have a different 
occasion. And if Peter leaps a puddle, we have one occasion of activity, 
and were a qualitatively identical Paul to leap a puddle instead, we would 
have a different one.
my second argument for Singularity has two premises:
(15) The subjects of (strict) counterfactual implication are states of 
affairs representing individual possible occasions of indeterministic 
activity.
(16) The antecedents of agent-general SCls represent merely types of 
possible occasions of indeterministic activity.
(16) follows from the modal fragility of individual occasions of activity; 
and more specifically and saliently, from the fact that a token occasion 
of free action is individuated in part by the identity of the agent who 
acts. I find (16)’s falsity just as absurd as, for example, the idea that a set 
or proposition has its non-relational properties accidentally (as if, for 
example, the very proposition that is that Socrates exists can be that 
Plato exists). my acceptance of (15) is primarily based on intuition, on 
the intuitive plausibility of the view that (granting the basic molinist 
picture) the role of counterfactually relevant information is to provide 
an individual occasion of indeterministic activity with respect to which 
something is counterfactually implied. However, perhaps I can inculcate 
similar intuitions in you, and I can rebut some objections to (15). but 
first, I will explain how this argument for Singularity supports a stronger 
conclusion.
In addition to distinguishing agent-singularity and agent-generality, 
we can distinguish circumstance-singularity and -generality. If an SCl 
25 Though such information might ground other kinds of consequents (and hence 
other kinds of conditionals, such as might- or would-probably-conditionals).
26 I borrow ‘modally fragile’ from Karen bennett, “Why the exclusion Problem Seems 
Intractable, and How, Just maybe, to Tract It”, Nous 37 (2003), 471-497, nn. 7-8.
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is agent-general, it is circumstance-general, because the identity of 
a  token circumstance of action partly depends on that of the agent 
“in” it. However, if an SCl is circumstance-general, it may or may not 
be agent-general. It depends on the extent to which the identity of an 
agent depends on circumstances in which it exists. The argument from 
counterfactual power is an argument directly for the thesis that an SCl 
is perfect only if it is agent-singular, whereas the present argument from 
the nature of counterfactual relevance is an argument for the thesis that 
an SCl is perfect only if it is both agent- and circumstance-singular (i.e., 
involving an individual agent in an individual circumstance). Further, 
inasmuch as the present argument does not hang on considerations 
pertaining to libertarian freedom, it supports a conclusion pertaining to 
SCIs in general.27
When it comes to causally necessitated states of affairs, the 
circumstance of activity’s identity as such is irrelevant to any (qualitative) 
fact about what happens, will happen, or would happen. For example, 
if certain events causally necessitate Peter’s jumping over a puddle of 
water, we can adjust the circumstance without jeopardizing the outcome, 
provided that the adjustments are causally irrelevant to Peter’s acting. 
For example, if we change the identity of one of Peter’s sandals, Peter will 
still be causally necessitated to jump. likewise, if we switch out Peter for 
a qualitatively identical Paul, the agent will still be causally necessitated 
to jump.28 but we are dealing with SCIs, and counterfactually relevant 
factors do not ground consequent states of affairs in this way. So 
we should not assume that what is causally irrelevant in the case of 
something causally necessitated is counterfactually irrelevant in the case 
of something counterfactually implied. 
Consider two (token) circumstances C and C* in which Peter might 
find himself that are identical with respect to causally relevant factors, 
circumstances in which Peter would have the power both to A and to 
refrain from A’ing. let us suppose that C and C* are qualitatively identical 
and indiscernible to Peter, and let ‘D’ stand for a circumstance-type 
27 I do not mean to imply that the first argument could not be adapted in support of 
stronger conclusions. For example, we could replace Peter and Paul in u and u* with 
atoms randomly suffering decay, and try to evoke intuitions to the effect that what 
happens with the two is independent.
28 Hence, there appears to be no reason to doubt the truth of certain subjunctive 
conditionals with general antecedents which we may call ‘subjunctive conditionals of 
compatibilist freedom’.
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of which C and C* are possible tokens. It is possible that C > A (i.e., 
that Peter would freely A in C), that C > ~A (i.e., that Peter would not 
freely A in C), that C* > A, and that C* > ~A. Why should it not be 
possible that both C > A and C* > ~A? C and C* are different (token) 
circumstances of action, after all. If you are inclined to agree that this 
is possible,29 I think your intuitions (at least implicitly) favour the view 
that (15) is true and that SCIs the antecedents of which represent token 
circumstances are pure. If it is possible that C and C* counterfactually 
imply different outcomes, then some differences between C and C* are 
counterfactually relevant. Conversely, if you are inclined to think that 
an antecedent that represents merely a circumstance-type like D could 
(strictly) counterfactually imply anything, then I think you should have 
found it intuitive that, necessarily, C > A just in case C* > A.
let us suppose that the referents of ‘C’ and ‘C*’ are separated by time, 
rather than by worlds; and that God places the apostle Philip in D (and 
thereby C), lets him act, places him in D again (and thereby C*), lets 
him act, and so on (for example, God could be making him undergo 
his meeting with the ethiopian eunuch30 over and over). because D 
comprehends all the causally relevant factors, we may suppose that, 
whenever Philip is in D, he neither remembers nor is otherwise affected 
by any prior D-tokens. Now, I find it eminently plausible, not merely that 
it is possible that Philip A in C, that he refrain in C, that he A in C*, and that 
he refrain in C*; but that it is possible that Philip both A in C and refrain 
in C*. Conversely, I find it extremely implausible that Philip’s A’ing in the 
first instantiation of D would “lock him in” such that, in every iteration, 
his power to refrain from A’ing would consist in a counterfactual power 
over what he did in the past.31 If you agree, then you should agree that 
C and C* possibly counterfactually imply different outcomes. Now, I see 
no relevant difference between a case where the token circumstances are 
separated by time and a case where they are “separated by worlds”; in 
virtue of which one should find it intuitive that only in the first kind of 
case are differences between the token circumstances counterfactually 
relevant. unless you do, it seems to me that you should accept (15).
29 Which Alexander Pruss would not be, it seems to me. See Pruss, “Prophecy Without 
middle Knowledge”, pp. 445-454.
30 Acts 8:26-40.
31 my thinking on this and related issues is significantly indebted to Flint 
(correspondence).
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letting ‘C’ and ‘C*’ stand again for the incompossible token 
circumstances in which Peter might find himself, the above thought 
experiment involving diachronic circumstance iteration undermines 
any objection to the compossibility of C > A and C* > ~A that trades on 
any of the following principles:
(17) If (S&T) > U and there is no reason to think that the outcome 
would be different given S&T*, then (S&T*) > U
(18) If T is causally irrelevant to U, then T is counterfactually 
irrelevant to U
(19) If T is epistemically irrelevant to a belief that (S&T) > U, then T 
is counterfactually irrelevant to U.
For if we consider the case of Philip and let ‘T’ stand for some information 
pertaining to which token circumstance is currently underway, we have 
a very plausible counterexample to (17) through (19).
I have tried to elicit intuitions supporting (15), address some 
potential objections to (15), and place the burden of argumentation on 
one inclined to deny (15). I will conclude by addressing the intuition 
some might have that, granting C > A, C* > ~A could not be (co-)true. 
First, even if C > A and C* > ~A are incompossible, (15)’s falsity does not 
follow. For suppose that C > A becomes true in virtue of the obtaining 
of antecedent and consequent, and not in virtue of any perfect SCl 
D > A; and hence that the entailment of C* > A is mediated by something 
other than an instance of strict counterfactual implication (such as one’s 
semantics for counterfactuals). Second, there are (defeasible) reasons to 
treat such an apparent intuition as untrustworthy. Firstly, one might fail 
to sufficiently consider the modal fragility of token circumstances and 
assume (perhaps tacitly) that the token circumstance of action (or even 
the token instance of acting) “persists” from C to C*. Secondly, one might 
fail to sufficiently discriminate between intuitions about an agent’s acting 
that are indeterminate with respect to whether it acts “freely” and those 
about its acting “freely”, or intuitions about an agent’s acting “freely” that 
are indeterminate with respect to specific theories of free agency and 
those about its acting “freely” in a libertarian sense, or a free agent and 
a free action, or a derivatively “free” action and a(n intrinsically) free one.
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VI. CoNCluSIoN
Having granted that there might be facts of the matter about what agents 
would freely do in various circumstances, I distinguished perfect and 
imperfect subjunctive conditionals of libertarian freedom, only the former 
taking their truth-values primitively (sections II.–III.), and presented two 
arguments (trading on considerations pertaining to counterfactual power 
and counterfactual relevance respectively) for the thesis that perfect ones 
must be agent-singular; that is, about an individual as opposed to agent-
type (IV.–V.). Further, I sketched how this thesis poses problems for any 
would-be molinist who finds it implausible that God grasps possible 
creatures in their individuality prior to creation (I., III.).
